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In recent debates on climate change and migration, the focus on the ﬁgure of ‘climate refugees’
(tainted by environmental determinism and a crude understanding of human mobility) has given
ground to a broader conception of the climate–migration nexus. In particular, the idea that
migration can represent a legitimate adaptation strategy has emerged strongly. This appears to be
a positive development, marked by softer tones that de-securitise climate migration. However,
political and normative implications of this evolution are still understudied. This article contributes
to ﬁlling the gap by turning to both the ‘climate refugees’ and ‘migration as adaptation’ narratives,
interrogating how and whether those competing narratives pose the question of (in)justice. Our
analysis shows that the highly problematic ‘climate refugees’ narrative did (at least) channel justice
claims and yielded the (illusory) possibility of identifying concrete rights claims and
responsibilities. Read in relation to the growing mantra of resilience in climate policy and politics,
the more recent narrative on ‘migration as adaptation’ appears to displace justice claims and
inherent rights in favour of a depoliticised idea of adaptation that relies on the individual migrant’s
ability to compete in and beneﬁt from labour markets. We warn that the removal of structural
inequalities from the way in which the climate–migration nexus is understood can be seen as
symptomatic of a shrinking of the conditions to posing the question of climate justice.
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Introduction
Migration is a powerful source of anxiety incollective imaginary and consciousness. Therecent events in Europe and its latest ‘refugee
crisis’ have generated powerful shock waves. The
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (2015) aptly diagnosed
a widespread ‘moral panic’, fuelled by the spectre of
invasion and accompanied by the scapegoating of the
‘Other’ – regressive reactions materialised in the walls
and fences erected around Europe. To be sure, the
anxiety accompanying migration has a number of
undercurrents. The crisis is also made particularly
thorny by the fact that the dire fate of the displaced is
a strong reminder of one’s own vulnerability. And we
should not forget that responsibility, care and justice
(as well as guilt) are also among the sentiments stirred
up by the unfolding of the drama of displacement.
Indeed, what makes ignoring the ‘crisis’ so difﬁcult is
also a widespread sense that not responding to a
request of hospitality from people escaping war,
slaughter or even ‘just’ poverty, is morally wrong. This
is not least because mass movements of people are
often caused by expulsions linked to globalised socio-
economic inequalities (Sassen 2014) and to the
postcolonial character of the present. Responsibility
and care, although sometimes well hidden, survive in
the public conscience even at the apex of negative
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sentiments over migration, as some opinion polls
indicate (e.g. TENT Foundation 2016).
This paper starts from the conviction that this
intricate affective knot has also had an important
role in the way so-called ‘climate migration’ has
emerged as a salient policy issue – with the prospect
of large-scale movements of people triggered by
climate change generating both fears and calls to
protect those affected. While gathering momentum
and evolving into a recognised phenomenon in
established scientiﬁc and policy arenas1, the
climate–migration nexus has been understood in a
number of different ways2. Various studies illustrate
the coexistence of framings that depict the affected
populations as victims or security threats (with the
nexus understood in terms of displacement), as
adaptive agents (with migration seen as a coping
mechanism or adaptation strategy), and as political
subjects (for an overview of these framings, see
Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Mayer 2014; McNamara
and Gibson 2009; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015).
Resonating with the recurrent waves of alarm and
alarmism on migration and asylum (of which the
recent events in Europe are a paradigmatic example),
the framing of the climate change and migration
nexus in terms of mass displacement, ‘climate
refugees’ and security has proved very resilient. This
framing – close to what earlier literature identiﬁed as
the maximalist (Morrissey 2012; Suhrke 1994) or
alarmist approach (Gemenne 2011) – has been very
inﬂuential, if not dominant, in academic (Biermann
and Boas 2008; Myers 2002; Reuveny 2007; Stern
2007; Westra 2009), advocacy (Christian Aid 2007;
Environmental Justice Foundation 2009) and policy
(Council of the European Union 2008; WBGU 2008)
arenas, and is dominant in the portrayal of the issue
offered up by the media. The ‘success’ and
problematic character of the maximalist approach are
witnessed by the frequency with which violence and
conﬂict in several parts of the world (and the surge in
the number of arrivals at Europe’s borderland) are
associated with environmental and climate change.
While a few scientiﬁc studies (Cook et al. 2016;
Kelley et al. 2015) have explored the linkages
between climate change and the Syrian crisis (for a
more accurate account, see Fr€ohlich 2016), some
media coverage has propagated a simplistic version
that links the conﬂict and related displacement to
climate change (rather than to a number of
economic, social and political matters), making the
Syrian situation into a worrying anticipation of what
is (said) to come with an escalating global warming3.
However, the last few years have also witnessed
what we could call a change in the ‘power balance’
among the framings, with the afﬁrmation of
discourses that articulate the climate change and
migration nexus in the context of the emerging
neoliberal governmentality of adaptation and
resilience (cf. Bettini 2014; Felli 2013; Methmann
and Oels 2015; Turhan et al. 2015). The idea that
migration can represent a legitimate adaptation
strategy has gained ground (Black et al. 2011; Tacoli
2009; UK Government Ofﬁce for Science 2011;
Warner et al. 2012), witnessing a partial but important
relocation of migration from the domains of security and
humanitarian emergency management to that of
development (Bettini and Gioli 2016). At least in
academic and policy contexts, there has been a shift of
focus from ‘climate refugees’ to ‘climate migration’ and
a broader array of mobility responses.
How do these different framings and discourses on
the climate–migration nexus relate to the intricate
tangle of reactions that migration and displacement
raise? With such a question in mind, this article
focuses on a rather underexplored issue, namely the
different ways in which competing framings respond
to and integrate the sense of justice, (in)equality, guilt
and responsibility discussed above. In particular, we
question how the shift from climate refugees to
climate migration could signal a marginalisation of
the very problem of ‘climate justice’ in the debate on
the climate change and migration nexus, symptomatic
of broader tendencies in climate politics. Indeed, we
will document a move away from inherent rights,
towards the idea that risk should be governed through
the fostering of individual preparedness, which in this
case falls on the shoulders of (potential) migrants. The
debate becomes less about institutional agents (States
and the international community) securing the
inherent human rights of some kind of (potentially
dangerous) victim, and more about the ways in which
individuals can utilise migration to become resilient.
This article discusses the risks that the emerging
narrative on ‘migration as adaptation’ entails in terms
of a shrinking of the space for the identiﬁcation (or
reclamation) of rights and responsibilities, which are
among the ingredients of the problematisation of
climate change in terms of international and
intersectional justice.
The following section contextualises the evolution
of the debate on climate migration within the
broader trend towards resilience in international
policy discourses, both of which we will argue are
manifested in the ‘migration as adaptation’ narrative.
Following from this, we discuss how climate justice
is problematised in relation to the linked issues of
climate change and migration. The fourth and ﬁfth
sections consider the ‘climate refugees’ and the
‘migration as adaptation’ narratives in turn and detail
how rights and responsibilities are conﬁgured,
pointing to what this means for how inequalities are
understood and (potentially) acted upon.
We conclude that the climate change and
migration nexus is moving away from an approach
based on inherent rights and justice to a self-
help approach to climate change adaptation based
on resilience and preparedness. Remedying the
inequalities that underscore how the negative effects
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of climate change are distributed slips under the
radar, and instead, people are expected (or perhaps
forced) to overcome the difﬁculties posed by climate
change by living up to the opportunities afforded to
them by labour migration.
Post-interventionism and resilience
Discourses on the climate change and migration
nexus are not evolving in a vacuum. Rather they
reﬂect broader shifts that are underway in how risk is
conceptualised and governed in terms of resilience
(Chandler 2014; Evans and Reid 2014), and in how
climate change is governed through the ‘holy trinity
of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and resilience’
(Taylor 2015, 53; see also Grove 2014a; Watts
2015). The concept of resilience, which can be
traced back to a peculiar cross-breeding between
ecological and economical rationalities (Reid 2012),
has proliferated in a number of policy domains such
as those concerned with global environmental
change, humanitarian interventions, and international
development (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, see also the
Themed Section on Vulnerability, Resilience and
Adaptation in this Journal, vol. 182(2)). Resilience
generally refers to the ability of an individual or
community to withstand, adapt to, and recover from
external disturbances – of which climate change is a
prominent example. This deﬁnition poses climate
change as an unavoidable external disturbance to
which individuals and communities must adapt.
Therefore, some authors have warned that the focus
on resilience may draw attention to adaptation at the
expense of the mitigation of climate change
(Methmann and Oels 2015).
In exploring the concept of human security,
Chandler contrasts resilience practices with ‘high-
proﬁle debates and discussions of humanitarian
intervention and human rights in the 1990s’
(Chandler 2012, 213), which marked the peak
period for enthusiasm regarding interventionist
‘humanitarian operations’ where human rights (and
the inability or unwillingness of the state in question
to protect these human rights) were propagated as
the reason for intervention. However, Chandler
charts a move away from this liberal internationalist
paradigm and its claims on the West to act as
protectors or humanitarian interveners, towards more
decentralised (although not necessarily less violent)
mechanisms fostering the self-securing agency (i.e.
the resilience) of people considered to be vulnerable
(Chandler 2012).
The interventionist paradigm of the 1990s and the
resilience paradigm that has been replacing it
interpellate very different subjects. As Joseph points
out, not without optimism, the concept of resilience
‘encourages the idea of active citizenship, whereby
people, rather than relying on the state, take
responsibility for their own social and economic
well-being’ (Joseph 2013, 42), in contrast to
the ‘victimhood’ conferred on subjects under
interventionism. The recognition of local agency has
been welcomed from many quarters as a positive
development in comparison both to the paternalism
associated with the status of a ‘victim’, and to the
perils to which those identiﬁed as threats are
exposed. However, as others highlight, the resilient
subject is in effect deprived of a number of
‘inalienable rights’ (Evans and Reid 2013, 91); rather
than a stable rights-holder, the resilient subject is
primarily an ‘adaptation machine’ (Grove 2014b)
compelled to learn (if s/he is to gain the right to
survive) the art of navigating through a precarious
and dangerous existence (Evans and Reid 2014). The
resilience discourse does not share one of the core
elements of the liberal interventionist paradigm, that
is the expectation (more or less frequently fulﬁlled)
that States should take on the responsibility to secure
their population and prevent human rights violations
within their borders, and also to intervene beyond
their borders when other States are unable or
unwilling to do the same. There is a shift in how
agency and responsibility are understood to operate,
as people become responsible agents themselves,
expected to mobilise their capabilities to become
resilient and thus signiﬁcantly reducing the
expectation of an intervention by States.
Resilience and adaptation: what room for climate
justice?
In line with the broad shifts at play in international
relations, climate change politics is also witnessing a
move towards resilience and adaptation. This shift
has the potential to reconﬁgure (or eclipse) the ways
in which equality and justice are posed as questions
of political and ethical relevance in the context of
climate change.
Traditionally, questions of distribution and transfer
of resources (‘responsibility’ and justice) have been at
the crux of climate change politics, both in and
outside the fora of climate negotiations. The principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities was a
cornerstone of the original text of the United Nation
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC
1992, 3.1), and the heavily caveated inclusion of
‘climate justice’ in the preamble of the Paris
Agreement (UNFCCC 2016) indicates that these
discussions remain greatly contested. Importantly, (in)
justice and responsibility are the keywords and
banners that have mobilised powerful social
movements around climate change (Bond 2012;
Chatterton et al. 2013; Schlosberg and Collins 2014).
Posing the question of justice and responsibility
rests on a logic that is straightforward: (a) climate
change may cause harm to humans; (b) the harms
caused are widely considered unjust (see for instance
chapter 4 in Broome 2012), as not everyone
The Geographical Journal 2017 183 348–358 doi: 10.1111/geoj.12192
© 2016 The Authors. The Geographical Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)
350 One step forward, two steps back?
contributes to the same extent to the creation of the
negative impacts of CO2 emissions, not everyone
enjoys equally the related beneﬁts, and not everyone
has the same means to cope with the impacts; (c) the
wrong should be repaired in ways that take into
consideration (b).
This reasoning is easy to comprehend, widely
shared, and compatible with most ethical standpoints.
Nonetheless, the precise deﬁnition of the terms,
let alone the translation of such reasoning into action,
is far from straightforward (an issue to which we
will return in relation to the climate refugee ﬁgure).
This is for a number of non-banal reasons – and not
only because actors (States, private companies,
investors, individuals) are not keen to accept
responsibilities (and related costs). The very
deﬁnition of responsibility has sustained a lively
debate within philosophy (for deﬁnitions and
alternative approaches, see Broome 2012; Caney
2014). In political and geographical studies, there
have been extensive discussions on the scale of
action. While there has been a sort of ‘carbon
nationalism’ (states have been the unit for the
calculation of historical cumulative emissions,
scenarios and quotas), there have been numerous
proposals to focus instead on producers (Frumhoff
et al. 2015) or even individuals (Chakravarty et al.
2009). The intergenerational dimension associated
with permanent or long-term change adds another
layer of complexity (Gardiner et al. 2010).
Despite such conundrums, the bottom line is that
climate change has emerged as connected to a
potential ‘wrong’, in theory quantiﬁable, measurable
and attributable, which should be avoided as far as
possible through climate mitigation measures.
Crucially, this understanding and the invocation of
climate (in)justice (Roberts and Parks 2007; Schlosberg
and Collins 2014) mirror a problematisation that
poses, or at least enables, questions of inequality and
redistribution. The result is that ‘civil society’, States
and the ‘international community’ are said to have a
responsibility to (re)act in order to protect those most
exposed to the adverse impacts of climate change
(as posited by the interventionist paradigm).
Human rights have played an important role in
this problematisation of climate change. Despite the
gulf between the idealistic goals of the international
human rights regime and the realpolitik behind its
genealogy and operation, it is a discourse that carves
out some space for the problem of ‘injustice’ – and
indeed most deﬁnitions of climate justice contain
some kind of reference to human rights. The formal
premise of equality of rights allows for the
problematisation of events or structural factors which
threaten to disturb equality of rights as ‘wrongs’ –
and this is often a foundational argument for
protection initiatives and interventionist actions
(however problematic both may prove to be).
Equality is also a crucial component of rights-based
calls to protect people from the harmful impacts of
climate change.
The shift towards resilience can change the very
problematisation of climate change. This is not only
because it goes hand in hand with the growing
focuses on adaptation and on loss and damage (vis a
vis mitigation), justiﬁed by the increase in scientiﬁc
warnings that a certain amount of climate change is
‘locked in’ and that even adaptation will be unlikely
to absorb all impacts (Roberts and Huq 2015). More
importantly, it undermines the possibility for the
inequalities associated with climate change (in terms
of historical responsibilities, exposure, coping
capabilities) to be understood as a ‘wrong’; instead
of being inequalities, they become differences. These
different conditions become ethically neutral
circumstances, a result of the roll of the dice
inherent in human existence. The adverse impacts of
climate change are re-signiﬁed as disturbances to
which the resilient subject adapts as s/he learns ‘the
art of living dangerously’ (Evans and Reid 2014).
Once enrolled in the struggle to become resilient,
people become responsible for overcoming these
challenges themselves. In practice, rather than States
being (formally) compelled to reduce inequalities
because of their responsibility to intervene to repair
a wrong and protect against its impacts, post-
interventionism means that people, including
potential climate migrants, are not seen as exposed
to structural injustice, and instead are expected to be
able to secure themselves against the odds they are
facing.
Resilience does not rest on the premise of (or
search for) equality: whilst the negative effects of
climate change may have catastrophic consequences
for some people (those who are not resilient), others
will be able to withstand, adapt to and recover from
these external stressors. A right to be protected is thus
pushed to the background and the argument for such
responsibilities, which is so core to climate justice, is
replaced by initiatives to promote resilience.
Climate refugees
The logic outlined above, of climate change as a
‘wrong’ causing harm in a way that is fundamentally
unjust, impacting negatively on the rights of those
who are affected and thus requiring action, is clearly
visible in the ﬁgure of the climate refugee. The idea
is simple, even simplistic: beyond a certain
threshold, climate change (via desertiﬁcation, sea-
level rise, droughts, extreme weather events, etc.)
will render several vulnerable areas uninhabitable.
These ‘vulnerability hot-spots’ (often visualised by
maps, e.g. WBGU 2008) will generate waves of
climate refugees – victims of climate-induced
displacement (notably from the global South) in
search of shelter (in the global North). This is the
ﬁgure of climate refugees in a nutshell.
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Rights (and their rooting in the premise of
equality) have been an essential ingredient of these
debates. Human rights have offered a key tool with
which to gauge the desirability of competing
measures, with the defence of human rights from
the impacts of climate change representing a goal
for policy (see Leighton 2011; McAdam 2012;
Schade 2013; Westra 2009). Rights also provide
normative legitimacy and formal justiﬁcation to
proposed policy interventions, with human rights
advocates emphasising the ﬁgure of climate
refugees as the ‘human face’ of climate change.
The responsibilities accompanying these human
rights concerns are two-fold: ensuring that climate
refugees are not created in the ﬁrst place (bringing
climate change mitigation and in situ adaptation
under consideration); and introducing mechanisms
to protect those people who are nevertheless
displaced. The operationalisation of the idea of
‘protecting climate refugees’ has passed through
two avenues: some have advocated an extension of
the Geneva Refugee Convention to include climate-
displaced persons (Conisbee and Simms 2003;
Williams 2008), while others propose development
of an ad hoc protocol or convention tailored to
recognise the rights of ‘climate refugees’ (Biermann
and Boas 2010; Docherty and Giannini 2009).
What we see is a combination of human rights
(with States and the international community having
a duty to prevent the human rights violations that
occur in a situation of climate change-induced
displacement); humanitarian principles (those most
vulnerable are also those with the least means to
cope); and historical responsibility (industrialised
countries are identiﬁed as disproportionately
responsible for causing the problem, based on
historical carbon dioxide emissions). The calls for
action to protect climate refugees are resonant of
the interventionist framing of human security that
Chandler describes as prevalent particularly in the
late 1990s, in which States and the international
community (are said to) take on responsibility for
preventing human rights violations and
humanitarian catastrophes (Chandler 2012).
The framing of the climate–migration nexus
through the ﬁgure of climate refugees has been
heavily criticised. To begin with, the very
identiﬁcation of the ‘climate refugee’ is far from
straightforward, in that it assumes the possibility of
singling out an environmental stressor as the sole
cause of a movement and of attributing that stressor
to climate change. The underlying idea is that when
the impacts of climate change pass a threshold they will
‘automatically’ originate displacement. This conception
builds upon an environmentally deterministic and
mono-causal understanding of human migration that
pathologises it (Castles 2002; Hulme 2008; Jakobeit
and Methmann 2012; Oels 2010). It silences those
‘expected’ to move (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012;
McNamara and Gibson 2009) and in effect has clear
racialised traits (Baldwin 2013). Various critiques
have questioned the conceptual and practical
compatibility of the idea of ‘climate refugees’ with
existing legal systems and human rights regimes
(IOM 2007; K€alin and Schrepfer 2012; UNHCR
2009; Zetter 2010), often pointing to the fact that
most climate-related movements can be expected to
take place within national boundaries (Tacoli 2009).
Moreover, by emphasising a spectre of mounting
waves of climate refugees, these narratives risk
facilitating a securitisation of migration in destination
countries (Bettini 2013; Elliott 2010; Hartmann
2010; Smith 2007).
Migrants as agents of adaptation
The conceptual coupling of climate change with
displacement has gradually moved from centre
stage, at least in academic and policy contexts,
freeing up space for new discourses focusing on
adaptation (Warner 2012). The publication of the
inﬂuential Foresight report on migration and global
environmental change, commissioned by the UK
Government Ofﬁce for Science (2011), had a crucial
role in afﬁrming a broader view on the climate
change and migration nexus: cross-border
displacement is seen as only part of the problem,
with ‘forced’ immobility also listed among the
possible negative outcomes of climatic stressors
(Black et al. 2012). In particular, governed migration
has been promoted as a potentially positive form of
adaptation and as a strategy for managing risks
associated with changing environmental conditions
(ADB 2012; Black et al. 2011; Warner and Aﬁﬁ
2014; Warner et al. 2012), with the vulnerable no
longer portrayed only as passive victims in need of
international protection, but also as ‘agents of
adaptation’. Largely mimicking existing debates on
‘migration and development’ (see Gioli et al. 2016;
in particular Bettini and Gioli 2016; Wrathall and
Suckall 2016), this boils down to looking at the role
of labour migration, and of individual or collective
ﬁnancial and social remittances, as buffers during
environmental disaster (for a review see Le De et al.
2013) and as a means for climate adaptation.
Four particularly salient features of the ‘new’
understanding of migration as adaptation should be
highlighted here. The ﬁrst is that, although loosely
deﬁned as migration or mobility, it is labour
migration that becomes dominant in the new
discourse. Second, and based on the New
Economics of Labour Migration (Stark and Levhari
1982), circular mobility is seen as the most virtuous
type of migration: the household is taken as the unit
of analysis and only some members migrate and
remit, keeping the ties with their household
throughout the process (Stark 1991). Remittances are
hence conceptualised as a ‘risk mitigation strategy’
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whereby labour migration is part of a portfolio of
livelihood strategies that households use to shield
themselves from various types of risk (e.g. economic,
environmental, conﬂict). In this context, remittances
have been described as a form of ‘household
sponsored insurance system’ (Yang and Choi 2007).
Third, this type of mobility is overwhelmingly
practised in the global South, where access to
ﬁnancial instruments and products and other forms
of social protection is scant (Schrieder and Knerr
2000). Additionally, informal work, precarious land
rights, and inherently risky subsistence agriculture,
severely limit the ability of people to cope with
crisis, and remittances constitute a more reliable
source of income which is not affected by local
conditions. Having this scenario in mind, leading
international bodies conceptualise migration in a
way that prioritises circular migration (Hugo 2008;
World Bank 2013) and increasingly, South–South
types of movement. Fourth, migrant selectivity is
crucial as human capital should match the goal of
ideally maximising while diversifying incomes.
Migrants involved in this circular kind of mobility,
from and within the global South, are therefore
healthy, young and predominantly men (for a
critique, see Kunz 2011). This has several (gendered)
implications, including the frequently highlighted
fact that the costs of migration are high (in terms of
both social and ﬁnancial capital), and remittances
seldom beneﬁt the poorest households (De Haas
2005; Mazzucato et al. 2008), and may even
exacerbate existing inequality and vulnerability in
the context of disasters (Le De et al. 2015).
In sum, the idea of migration as adaptation has
emerged in the wake of a more comprehensive
understanding of the climate change–migration
nexus. The narrow focus on the environment as a
driver and root cause for displacement has given
ground to a ‘developmentalised’ narrative that
couches the question of climate and migration in the
context of the complex and fast-changing processes
currently reshaping the ‘global South’ – where
(global) environmental change is but one among
many drivers of change in general, and of mobility
in particular.
In contrast to the wealth of critiques of the ‘climate
refugees’ narrative which exist, remarkably few
studies (among the exceptions are Baldwin 2014;
Bettini 2014; Felli 2013; Felli and Castree 2012;
Methmann and Oels 2015; Turhan et al. 2015) have
explored the policy and political implications of this
shift, and its relations to broader changes in the
landscapes of climate politics, migration governance,
and developmental interventions. This is a signiﬁcant
gap, as increasingly the integration between disaster
risk, adaptation to climate change, and development
is prescribed as a necessary step for meeting human
development goals (Agrawal and Lemos 2015;
Schipper and Pelling 2006), and the mainstreaming of
environmental concerns into wider policy agendas is
actively pursued.
The evaporation of (in)justice?
The shift we have outlined in the discursive
landscape has profound implications vis a vis the
very possibility of posing climate change as a
problem of (in)justice. As we have seen, the two
understandings of the climate change and migration
nexus on which we have focused are emanations of
different forms of governmentality and different
international policy discourses – calling on different
scientiﬁc expertise, policy arenas and imaginaries.
The ﬁgure of the climate refugee emanates from
an outdated world map characterised by a ‘simple’
North–South line (in the Kyoto protocol, the world is
divided between Annex 1 countries and the rest).
The actors with key roles are States and an
‘international community’, torn between the
benevolence of human rights and the ‘noise of
weapons’ echoing from national security concerns.
This framing silences those people who are directly
experiencing ecological vulnerability, relegating
them to the double role of agency-less victims and
sources of danger. However, the discourse on
climate refugees focuses on the inherent right to
protection held by displaced persons as much as on
concern for the implications of ungoverned mass
movements of people. One core element of this
narrative, arguably one of the reasons for its
resilience even among progressive actors, is that it
addresses the sense of (in)justice that accompanies
both climate change and displacement, and offers a
clear although problematic route in which to
channel it. To be clear we are not claiming that the
ﬁgure of the climate refugee and the discourses built
on it offer(ed) sound, sustainable and progressive
mechanisms for the deﬁnition and ‘implementation’
of such responsibility. The conundrums surrounding
responsibility for climate mitigation and adaptation
that the literature highlights (see third section) are
not resolved in any meaningful way by the ﬁgure of
the climate refugee. Quite to the contrary, we are
convinced that the ﬁgure of the climate refugee is
analytically ﬂawed, normatively problematic, and
legally impracticable. Nonetheless, an important
ingredient of discourses on climate refugees, and
one with signiﬁcant discursive effects, is that they
pose the question of responsibility, which entails a
problematisation of climate change and its impacts
on human mobility that considers the issue of
climate justice.
At least in its humanitarian/progressive articulation,
the ﬁgure of the climate refugee is a reminder
that climate change enshrines a ‘foundational’
international inequality – both in terms of historical
responsibilities and of differentiated adaptive
capacities (however under-deﬁned these aspects may
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be); it represents a tacit recognition of climate
vulnerability as the result of structural ‘wrongs’. On
these bases, States and ‘the international community’
are pinned down to their responsibility (and legal
duty) to protect/house/welcome/offer refuge to
ecologically vulnerable populations displaced by
climate change. Indeed, the ﬁgure of the climate
refugee has functioned in a number of campaigns
(Environmental Justice Foundation 2009; Greenpeace
2008; WPC 2010) as a reminder of the fundamental
injustice in climate change – a wrong to which
someone is exposed, with someone having a
responsibility for it, both in the sense of burden
sharing and in the sense of harm avoidance (for an
explanation of these two typologies of justice, see
Caney 2014).
In relatively subtle ways, the question of (in)
equality and the reparation of a wrong are displaced
from the core of the more recent narratives around
migration as adaptation. Rather than emphasising the
inherent rights of people affected by climate change
(rights that are to be protected), these narratives
emphasise the opportunity to move. The focus shifts
to the opportunities offered by labour mobility both
for the individual migrant and at the aggregate,
societal level. The question of responsibility takes on
a very different shape than in the climate refugees
narrative. Rather than preventing displacement or
establishing mechanisms to protect those who have
been displaced, the responsibility becomes one of
allowing, and even enabling, (some) people to
become mobile. This responsibility may ‘simply’
entail refraining from preventing people from moving
rather than undertaking costly in situ adaptation
measures or climate change mitigation, but could
also entail providing visas to people trying to
embark upon labour migration, or facilitating
migration more actively4.
The migration as adaptation narrative mirrors the
post-interventionist and resilience paradigms (see
second section), and reproduces the latter’s
economised and neoliberal character (Reid 2013).
Ecologically vulnerable populations are to be
transformed into adaptive subjects, hoping to reach a
dynamic form of socio-economic development based
on the idea of resilience goals (Agrawal and Lemos
2015). States become enforcers and facilitators rather
than active actors, with the market and self-
organisation becoming key mechanisms. In the case
of climate and migration, as for contemporary
mainstream opinion on the governance of migration,
the focus is on circular and/or temporary labour
migration, not least because of the autonomous
adaptation funding mechanism the remittances
promise to represent. The (economic) migrant (from
the global South, and moving within the global South)
is centre stage, an industrious individual who, by
gaining access to formal labour markets, increases his
own resilience. The nation state and the international
community are to govern the movement of labour
migrants in order for them to undertake adaptation
measures and secure themselves. The horizon of this
narrative is the fostering of resilience, which is
achieved with the ability of individuals to improve
their own situations. As the idea that those affected
most by the negative effects of climate change enjoy a
right to be protected is given less attention, the
impetus for pursuing the allocation of responsibility
and remedying the ills that climate change
causes also weakens. Thus the very idea of
responsibility (whether based on inherent rights,
general humanitarian sentiments or the principle of
historical responsibility) becomes less relevant, if not
irrelevant. The existence of inequalities is
depoliticised into difference. This is not to say that
climate change is not taken seriously; indeed, quite
the opposite, as it is being elevated into the highest
ranks in political and economic fora. But however
important, dangerous, and even potentially disruptive
climate change is said to be (e.g. World Bank 2014),
it is not posed mainly as a matter of (in)justice. Put in
extreme terms, one could say that the idea of any
‘wrong’ fades away; inequality and injustice end up at
the periphery, and no longer feature among the
deﬁning traits of the problematisation of climate
change and migration, upon which the narrative on
migration as adaptation resides.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the shift that has recently taken
place in the way the climate change–migration
nexus is predicated represents a step forward: at
least, the improved understanding of migration and
of the agency acknowledged in vulnerable
populations together offer sounder and more reﬁned
bases to understand and discuss the issue, inside and
outside the fora of international climate policy.
At the same time, this article warns that emerging
narratives and the solutions they envision may
represent a step backwards in terms of the possibility
of posing the question of justice. Our concern is that
the growing relevance of the narrative of migration
as adaptation, and the broader shifts it symptomatises
might mean that the idea of a foundational wrong
behind climate change, and the related responsibility
to do something about it, is replaced by a
depoliticised notion of resilience. If that were to be
the case, the impetus or obligation also to determine
politically any (re-)distribution of resources and to
address the constellation of inequalities in relation to
climate change would wane.
To be clear, there is no nostalgia for ‘climate
refugees’. The concept is ﬂawed, and the map to
which it speaks (carved by a linear South–North
divide) no longer exists, nor captures contemporary
networked geographies of socio-political inequality
and injustice. Moreover, the debate on climate
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change and migration can be expected to continue
along the bumpy and twisted path on which it has
travelled so far. In spite of the growing momentum
gained by the narrative on ‘migration as adaptation’,
the ﬁgure of the climate refugee is a die-hard
character, which has been brought back into the
limelight by recent events, not least in Syria and in
the Mediterranean (see ﬁrst section), and may well
experience a renaissance in policy and academic
arenas (see e.g. Gemenne 2015).
Nonetheless, our analysis highlights a number of
concerning tendencies in relation to the politics of
climate change and migration, with a possible
marginalisation of the foundation for posing the issue
of climate justice. Giving labour markets the
responsibility to redistribute resources and regulate
adaptation risks undermining the very possibility to
identify and act upon the constellations of
inequalities related to climate change. The risk is to
fall for the depoliticised illusion that the tensions and
structural injustices in debates about climate
refugees have disappeared; of which the narrative of
‘migration as adaptation’ could be a sign.
Finally, the increasingly restrictive attitudes that
both the EU and a number of European States have
shown with regard to asylum and the rights of
displaced persons only reinforce the awareness of
the struggles necessary to ‘force’ the question of
equality onto contemporary political landscapes. The
large numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean and
the push to securitise the borders within and around
Europe are a warning against the conservative
responses that could emerge against those
‘disenfranchised’ by the impacts of climate and
environmental change (even when they might be in
ﬂight). What these deaths and broken lives warn
against is the evaporation from contemporary
mainstream political discourse of even the formal
ideas of a responsibility to protect and to welcome,
and of care and justice. When thinking about a
future of changing climates, we see these as
tendencies to fear – rather than the mounting
numbers of destitute people on the move that agitate
much of today’s public debates.
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Notes
1 The latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) devotes signiﬁcant space to the phenomenon
(see chapter 12 in IPCC 2014), while the Ofﬁce of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHA) includes migration and displacement as human
rights concerns in the context of climate change (OHCHA
2009). Several policy initiatives have urged for action to
tackle and prepare for planned relocation (UNHCR 2014)
and international displacement as a consequence of climate
change (most prominently, the Nansen initiative, see
Gemenne and Br€ucker 2015). Within the regime of the
UNFCCC, human mobility features in the outcomes of the
2015 Paris Climate Summit (UNFCCC 2016) – as it did in
paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework
(UNFCCC 2010) and the Doha decision (UNFCCC 2013, 3/
CP.18, 7(a)(vi)). The Paris Agreement establishes a task force
on displacement under the remit of the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (UNFCCC
2016, par. 49).
2 Contrary to the assumption (shared by many studies) that the
polyphony (or cacophony) of deﬁnitions has represented an
obstacle to the advancement of the debate, arguably it has allowed
a number of disparate actors to address ‘climate migration’ in ways
compatible with their agendas, thereby contributing to the
recognition of the climate change and migration nexus as a
phenomenon and a topic for science and policy.
3 See for instance articles in The Independent (Bawden 2014),
The Guardian (2015), The National Observer (Dinshaw
2015), Time (Baker 2015).
4 For instance, in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami the
Government of the Republic of Korea gave priority to
migrants from affected areas in the 2005 roster of applicants
for the Employment Permit System (IOM 2007).
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